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CLASSIFYING MARITAL AND SEPARATE PROPERTYCOMBINATIONS AND INCREASE IN VALUE OF
SEPARATE PROPERTY
JoAN

I.

M.

KRAUSKOPF*

INTRODUCTION

The equitable distribution statutes in half the common law states authorize
or mandate division of marital property rather than all the property of the spouses.
A dual classification of property into marital and separate or nonmarital property
must occur under these statutes. West Virginia is such a "dual property" jurisdiction.
The concept of partnership marriage is the foundation of all equitable distribution systems, but this theoretical basis is heightened by a system dividing
only marital property. When a legislature provides solely for the division of only
property acquired during the marriage, it emphasizes that the partnership nature
of marriage justifies division. The partnership marriage concept underlies the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of 1970 (UMDA) which has been the model for
most of the statutes. Courts throughout the country have recognized that equitable
distribution is based on the premise that marriage is an economic partnership to
which both parties contribute. As one prominent court stated:
[T]he function of equitable distribution is to recognize that when a marriage ends,
each of the spouses, based on the totality of the contributions made to it, has
a stake in and right to a share of the marital assets accumulated while it endured,

not because that share is needed, but because those assets represent the capital
product of what was essentially a partnership entity.,
In agreement with this philosophy, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap2
peals has described marriage as roughly analogous to a business partnership.
Three components of the marriage partnership theory justify equitable distribution. First, the theory rests on an implied assumption that when two persons

* Manley 0. Hudson Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia College of Law;
A.B., 1954, Ohio University; J.D., 1957, the Ohio State University. The author was the William J.
Maier, Jr. Visiting Professor of Law at West Virginia University College of Law in 1986-87.
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 587, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748 (1985).
2 Dyer v. Tsapis, 162 W. Va. 289, 291-92, 249 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1978).
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marry they make a commitment 3 to the marital unit created by their union. Each

person Will contribute all time and effort to the family welfare and will share the
results of their commitment-good and bad, monetary and nonmonetary. Each
party relies upon the commitment of the other to serve the family unit. Second,
partnership marriage theory, as articulated by courts and analysts around the
world, recognizes the enablement function of homemaking which allows the income producer to produce.4 Justice Woodhouse of New Zealand said that "[t]he
provision of an efficient home base by a wife will leave the husband free to earn
the family income and attend to a business enterprise or the investment of capital
savings.. .

.-

Thus, both partners contribute to the success of the marital unit

in different but equally important ways. The third component of the partnership
marriage theory also was articulated by Justice Woodhouse when he stated that
"so must his achievements be reflected in the increasing value of the correlativecontribution of the wife. ' 6 The "so" in his statement reveals that because homemaking enables earning, the value of homemaking contributions increase in proportion to the increasing value of income production. In LaRue v. LaRue,7 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals apparently recognized this phenomenon
when it stated that the "value of homemaking services must also be considered
in relation to the net assets available at the time of the divorce" 8 and that homemaking "contributions must be calculated against the net marital estate." 9
II.
A.

CLASSIFICATION AND POWER

Classification Determines Power

The power granted to the courts to divide property in equitable distribution
is one of the broadest powers known to the law. The definition of property itself
Michelson v. Michelson, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638 (1976); Laughrey, Uniform MaritalProperty Act: A Renewed Commitment to the American Family, 65 NEB. L. Ray. 120 (1986). See, e.g.,
Preamble to the Maryland Equitable Distribution Act which provides:
Both spouses owe a duty to contribute his or her best efforts to the marriage, and
both by entering into the marriage, undertake to benefit both spouses and any children
they have .... [I]t is the policy of this State that when a marriage is dissolved the property
interests of the spouses should be adjusted fairly and equitably, with careful consideration
being given to both monetary and nonmonetary contributions made by the respective spouseg
to the well-being of the family....
1978 Md. Laws, ch. 794 at 2305.
4 Price v. Price, 113 A.D.2d 299, 306, 496 N.Y.S.2d 455, 460 (1985), aff'd,
69 N.Y.2d 8, 503
N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d (1986); Poe v. Poe, 711 S.W.2d 849, 855 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Herron
v. Herron, 608 P.2d 97 (1980); Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on
the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAs. L. Q. 101, 110-14 (1976); Landes, Economics of Alimony,
7 J. LEG. STUD. 35, 36 (1978); Kiker, Divorce Litigation: Valuing the Spouses' Contributions to the
Marriage,16 TiuAr 48 (Dec. 1980); see also Krauskopf, Recompense for FinancingSpouse's Education:
Legal Protectionfor the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REv. 379 (1980).
Reid v. Reid, [1979] 1 NEw ZEA. L. Rprs. 572, 584.
6

Id.

LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1985).
8 Id. at 323.
9 Id. at 326.
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is ordinarily so broad as to include all forms of value-marital home, other real
estate, shares of stock both publicly traded and in close corporations, automobiles,
airplanes and all other motorized vehicles, pension rights whether private or military, jewels, cash value of life insurance, pets and animals of any description,
contracts to buy or sell, bicycles and swing sets, video recorders and cameras,
accounts receivable, personal injury claims, eggbeaters and power saws, sole proprietorships and partnership interests, country and health club memberships, often
professional goodwill, and, occasionally increased earning capacity represented by
a degree or license. The property interests in these forms which are divisible are
as varied as the law recognizes-possessory interests such as leaseholds, intangible
rights such as stock options, future interests such as remainders after life estates,
nonvested retirement benefits, and interests under trusts.
Perhaps the most difficult concept to comprehend in a common law jurisdiction is that these interests are subject to division no matter how titled. Lawyers
must remind themselves constantly and then advise their clients of the two meanings of separate property-separate in the sense of not subject to division at
marriage dissolution and separate in the sense of separately titled but still marital
property and divisible. This means breaking old habits of protecting one spouse's
property from possible claims of the other spouse by titling it only in the first
spouse's name. Now, not only a dower interest in separately titled property, but
the entire value, if classified as- marital property, could be obtained by the other
spouse.

In dual property jurisdictions classification as marital property is the key that
unlocks the judicial power to divide.10 The final aspect of the power given to the
court is that not only may it divide the marital property equally, but it has broad
discretion to divide it unequally as well.
B.

Statutory Classification and Unresolved Problems

West Virginia uses the definition of property subject to division which prevails
in most dual property jurisdictions: marital property is "all property acquired by
either spouse during a marriage, except that marital property shall not include"'"
that defined as separate. The definition of marital property as all property acquired, unless excepted, should operate as a presumption to place the burden of
proof on the party asserting that property acquired during the marriage is not
marital.
The first four categories of separate property defined in the West Virginia
statute are typical of exceptions provided for in the UMDA and other dual prop-

10Statutory provisions which apparently allow West Virginia courts power to divide separate
property in order to protect business are beyond the scope of this Article. See W. VA. CODE § 482-32(e) (1986); Crandall, Critique of West Virginia's New Equitable Distribution Statute, 87 W. VA.
L. REv. 87, 88 (1984).
" W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e)(1) (1986).
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erty jurisdictions 12 and includes property (1) acquired before marriage; (2) acquired
during marriage in exchange for separate property acquired before marriage; (3)
excluded from marital property by a valid agreement of the parties; (4) and acquired during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, descent, or distribution."
Combinations of separate and marital property often occur because all earnings during marriage are marital; therefore, nearly all money spent on separate
property is marital. Marital property includes earnings from separate property,
such as rent from a separate apartment building. When the rent is used to improve
the premises, marital funds increase the value of separate property. Increase in
value of separate property also is separate under most statutes; however, these
statutes rarely address an increase in value due to marital funds spent on separate
property or marital effort devoted to separate property. Consequently, courts have
determined how to classify combinations of marital and separate property applying
one of three equitable principles.
First, whenever any marital money is spent on separate property, the entire
property is converted to marital. 14 Second, the inception of title rule classifies
property according to its character when title first "incepted."' 5 Thus, separate
property remains totally separate but the separate property owner may be obligated to reimburse the marital estate for money or effort spent on the separate
property. Third, the source of funds rule classifies a particular piece of property
depending upon the source of funds or effort which created its value.' 6 Such
property may have a dual character. Separate property is the portion of a piece
of property acquired with separate funds or effort and that portion's increase in
value due to inflation or market forces. When marital funds or efforts are used
to improve or pay for a piece of property, that portion, with its concommitant
increase in value, is marital property.
Since the West Virginia Legislature had the benefit of court decisions
from other states, it presumably acted with the background of those
interpretations in mind. It dealt with the combination issue by adopting the source of funds approach in its definitions of separate 7 and marl-

12 See,

e.g., ARK.

STAT.

ANN. § 55-404 (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV.

STAT.

403.190(1) (1984); Mo.

Rav. STAT. § 452.330 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121(b)(2) (Supp. 1985); N. Z. STAT. Matrimonial Property Act of 1976 § 8.
"1 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(f)(1)-(4) (1986).
14 See In re-Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill.
2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981), in which the court aplied
this rule and erroneously called it "transmutation"; the legislature subsequently changed the law. See
discussion, infra at notes 26-31 and accompanying text.

15See Fisher v. Fisher, 86 Idaho 131, 383 P.2d 840 (1963).
16 The Missouri Supreme Court is the most recent to adopt the source of funds rule.
See Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1984) (en bane).
, W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(0 (1986) defines separate property to include:
(1) Property acquired by a person before marriage; or
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tal' 8 property. Thus, a single piece of property can have a dual character in West
Virginia-part separate and part marital.
Although the theory of the West Virginia statute is obvious, its application
presents proof problems in determining contributions to separate property by marital funds and efforts over the years of a marriage. Furthermore, the statute is
silent or ambiguous concerning other legal rules for classification after a combination of funds. This Article will discuss three problem areas in classification
of combined separate and marital property when using the source of funds rule:
applying the rule of transmutation by intent; determining the source of increase
in value of mortgaged real estate; and apportioning the increase in value of a
separate business.

(2) Property acquired by a person during marriage in exchange for separate property
which was acquired before the marriage; or
(3) Property acquired by a person during marriage, but excluded from treatment as
marital property by a valid agreement of the parties entered into before or during the
marriage; or
(4) Property acquired by a party during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, descent or
distribution; or
(S) Property acquired by a party during a marriage but after the separation of the
parties and before the granting of a divorce, annulment or decree of separate maintenance;

and
(6) Any increase in the value of separate property as defined in subdivision (1), (2),
(3), (4) or (5) of this subsection which is due to inflation or to a change in market value
resulting from conditions outside the control of the parties.
S W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e) (1986), defines marital property to include:
(1) All property and earnings acquired by either spouse during a marriage, including every valuable right and interest, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible,

real or personal, regardless of the form of ownership, whether legal or beneficial, whether
individually held, held in trust by a third party, or whether held by the parties to the marriage
in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy or tenancy in common, joint tenancy
with the right of survivorship, or any other form of shared ownership recognized in other
jurisdictions without this state, except that marital property shall not include separate property as defined in subsection (f) of this section; and
(2) The amount of any increase in value in the separate property of either of the parties
to a marriage, which increase results from (A) an expenditure of funds which are marital
property, including an expenditure of such funds which reduces indebtedness against separate
property, extinguishes liens, or otherwise increases the net value of separate property, or
(B) work performed by either or both of the parties during the marriage.
The definitions of "marital property" contained in this subsection and "separate property" contained in subsection (f) of this section shall have no application outside the provisions of this article, and the common law as to the ownership of the respective property
and earnings of a husband and wife, as altered by the provisions of article three [§ 48-31 et seq.] of this chapter and other provisions of this code, are not abrogated by implication
or otherwise, except as expressly provided for by the provisions of this article as such
provisions are applied in actions brought under this article or for the enforcement of rights
under the article.
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TRANSMUTATION

Theory Compatible with Source of Funds

Under the theory of transmutation, the parties, by their own actions or manifestation of intent, may classify property so as to override any source of funds
or statutory classification. This equitable theory was developed by courts to solve
classification problems in accord with the parties' intent.' 9 It is a highly efficient
method of solving combination problems. For example, assume a contract to
purchase real estate before marriage for $20,000, a sixteen year marriage, and a
significant increase in value of the land due to market conditions so that at dissolution it is valued at $500,000. The spouse whose name is on the contract, deed,
and mortgage will have no initial presumption of marital property to counter
because he acquired title before the marriage. In inception of title jurisdictions,
the property would be entirely separate and the only obligation of the separate
owner would be to repay the marital estate for marital funds spent on it. Under
the source of funds theory, the property can be marital only to the extent marital
funds or efforts were devoted to it; therefore, the nonowner spouse must be able
to trace the expenditure of marital funds on the separate property. Tracing financial records of a family may entail complex and expensive discovery. Often,
the lawyer representing the nonowner spouse will hear, "Well, I always thought
it was ours. I'm sure we used our money to pay off that mortgage. I deserve
some of that $500,000. Oh, that was ten or twelve years ago. You can't expect
me to find records of that." At this point, unless the nonowner spouse can trace
marital funds to paying off the mortgage, the property remains separate. Assume
the nonowner spouse adds, "The reason I always thought it was ours is that we
changed the title right after we married. We titled it jointly in both our names."
If by titling the property in both names the parties intended it to be marital,
then transmutation would classify it as totally marital.
Under transmutation theory, if the parties evidence intent that the property
be marital, such intent overrides the statutory scheme for classification and trans-

9 Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, 852 (R.I. 1986); cf. Coney v. Coney, 207 N.J. Super. 63,
75, 503 A.2d 912, 918 (1985). In Illinois, the courts had not recognized that transmutation rested on
intent and applied what it termed "transmutation" to any combining of marital property with separate
property. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239. The effect was to
transform all separate property on which any marital funds had been expended to marital. Other
courts recognized the departure from true transmutation. See, e.g., Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 825
n.4; Kramer v. Kramer, 709 S.W.2d 157, 159 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). The Illinois approach has
been overturned by legislation. See In re Marriage of Harmon, 133 Il1. App. 3d 673, 479 N.E.2d 422

(1985).
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mutes the entire property to marital without regard to tracing funds. 20 Transmutation theory is consistent with recognizing marriage as a partnership of two

persons whose primary goal is furtherance of the family relationship. 21 Classification can be neat, clean, and quick in contrast to applying any of the statutory

definitions. Transmutation combines the advantages of administrative efficiency
with reaching results intended by the parties, thereby enhancing settlement possibilities.22

Transmutation and source of funds theories can exist simultaneously. Transmutation by intent has been adopted in the source of funds jurisdictions that
have ruled on it. 23 Since many of these decisions were prior to the enactment of

the West Virginia statute, 24 there is no reason to assume that the legislature in-

tended to preclude transmutation theory by statutory adoption of source of funds
theory. In fact, West Virginia Code section 48-2-32, which provides that contri-

bution of separate property should be considered in dividing the marital property,
would be useless unless transmutation is adopted. However, section 48-2-1(d),
which defines property exchanged for separate property as separate, is a special
application of the source of funds theory permitting separate contributions to
marital property to remain separate so long as such contributions can be traced.
Only transmutation can explain how property could become marital so that the

separate contribution would be a factor in the division. It does not matter that
the statutory scheme would classify property as separate; the parties' evidenced

intent to treat it as marital prevails. The equitable way to consider the separate
contribution to transmuted marital property is the division process required by

section 48-2-32.25
10The reverse of this procedure occurs when marital property or separate property is transferred
to one of the spouses as a personal gift. It is donative intent that causes the transformation in the
character of the property. The gift exception for separate property is so well accepted that courts
tend not to use transmutation terminology. See, e.g., Quinn, 512 A.2d at 854.
11Id. at 852.
2 Because this is an equitable theory utilized for classification purposes only, it is unnecessary
to find the parties' intent manifested to the level of a contract between the parties. No one is seeking
to enforce a contract. Consequently, the writer assumes there would be no problem because of W.
VA. CODE § 48-3-9 (1986) providing that contracts between husband and wife shall not be enforceable
unless there is a memorandum in writing.
2 See Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817; Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1983); Tibbetts v. Tibbetts,
406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979). Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256, 273-76, 477 A.2d 1163, 1171-73 (1984), apparently is the only decision in equitable distribution states refusing to recognize transmutation from
joint titling after adopting the source of funds theory. The opinion overzealously relied on language
in Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982) in which the court, in adopting source of
funds, criticized the unwise extension of transmutation that occurred in Illinois.
J,
J. Cobb, ed., Joint Names Transmutation, 3 EQ. DIST. J. 101 (Aug. 1986); Hall, 462 A.2d
1179. The one decision counter to the majority, Grant, 300 Md. 256, 477 A.2d 1163, has been rejected
by intermediate courts in Missouri, Kramer, 709 S.W.2d 157, and North Carolina, McLeod v. McLeod,
74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 448 (1985).
" For a possible example, see discussion of Dodd v. Hinton, infra, at note 30 and accompanying
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Establishing Transmutation

1. Joint Titling and Interspousal Gifts
A written memorandum of agreement between the parties may indicate their
intent that property, no matter how titled, was intended to benefit the marital
unit and, therefore, was intended to be marital. This would be the clearest evidence
for transmutation; however, this type of written agreement seldom exists. Instead,
other documentary evidence such as joint titling is more likely.
Many courts have held that joint titling transmutes the entire piece of jointly
titled property to marital property. 26 For example, if property worth $500,000 at
the time of the dissolution had been purchased by the husband prior to the marriage but subsequently was titled in both names, he would have evidenced intent
to transmute it to marital property. It would be subject to division in its entirety
without the necessity of determining how much, if any, marital funds had been
devoted to its purchase or improvement. Such decisions require reforming the
traditional common law presumption that joint titling constitutes a gift or settlement upon the other spouse of half the property. That presumption, if unmodified, would result in classifying each half of the property as nonmarital or
separate: the original owner's half acquired prior to marriage and the other spouse's
half acquired by gift during the marriage. The logic and effect of the unmodified
presumption would be contrary to the underlying concept of marriage partnership.
The more logical assumption is that joint titling, even if termed a gift, is meant
to benefit the marital unit. Its effect, should be to enlarge the amount of marital
property subject to equitable distribution when the unit is dissolved, not to constrict it. Consequently, several courts have modified the common law presumption
that joint titling constitutes a contribution of the entire property to the marital
estate for purposes of equitable distribution.
The common law presumption of a gift when one spouse purchases property
but takes title in the name of the other spouse is codified in West Virginia Code
section 48-3-10. When the equitable distribution law was enacted, the legislature
amended this section and provided that in actions involving equitable distribution
this presumption "shall not apply, and a gift between spouses must be affirmatively proved." 2 7 Although the legislature has removed the common law presumption from equitable distribution cases, it has not suggested how to classify
property purchased by one spouse but titled in the name of the other spouse.
Unless there is affirmative proof that the transaction was intended to benefit the

text. This analysis assumes that provisions in the distribution section, W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32 (1986),
cannot affect classification of property; thus, it differs from that of Crandall, supra note 10, at 91.
Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Quinn, 512 A.2d 848.
W. VA. CODE § 48-3-10 (1986).
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spouse individually rather than to benefit the marital unit, the courts are free to
adopt transmutation.2 In fact, the logical inference is that the legislature was

encouraging classification of such property as marital. 29 Consequently, perhaps
titling in one name and certainly joint titling, would be documentary evidence of

intent to benefit the marital unit and transmute separate property to marital. 3
A similar result should be reached whenever a gift to one party is actually
an investment for the family. Expensive jewels, art works, and even a stereo or

a television set might be purchased with either one spouse's separate funds or
with marital funds and "given" to the other spouse on a holiday or birthday.

Commonly, when this is done, both parties realize it to be a family investment.31
In this situation, the parties' intent would be that the item is marital property.

11In Brewer v. Brewer, 338 S.E.2d 229 (W. Va. 1985), the court stated that intent to make a
gift, in absence of the presumption, required proof of intent to bestow complete, absolute, irrevocable
title. This, of course, would create separate ownership. However, so long as this intent was for the
purpose of benefitting the marital partnership, the separately owned property could be classified as
marital for distribution purposes.
- Justice Neely advocates elimination of the gift presumption at the time of divorce to intramarital gifts of a nonpersonal nature in LaRue, 304 S.E.2d at 335-36 (Neely, J., concurring).
30Justice Neely noted in LaRue that titling "marital property in the name of one spouse is an

expedience and that mutual benefit is intended." Id. at 335. In Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d
709 (NV.Va. 1981), overruled, LaRue 304 S.E.2d 312, the court noted the "obvious fact.., that
transfers of property between spouses [are] usually intended for the joint benefit of both." Patterson,
277 S.E.2d at 716. See Hanstead v. Hamstead, No. 16765, slip op. (f. Va. Mar. 18, 1987).
Dodd v. Hinton, 312 S.E.2d 293 (W. Va. 1984), implies that this result may now be possible
in West Virginia. Dodd involved a partition action brought after LaRue but prior to the equitable
distribution statute. Mr. and Mrs. Hinton bought a home jointly titled and mortgaged. Mr. Hinton
later made some payments with his own funds. He then sold his previously owned residence and
deposited the funds in a checking account jointly titled with Mrs. Hinton. They withdrew these funds
and applied them to pay off the balance of the loan on the jointly titled house. The common law
presumption of a gift of half to Mrs. Hinton applied both when the husband made payments on the
loan on the jointly titled home and when he deposited funds in the joint checking account. A divorce
suit had been completed. The court affirmed partition, noting that the husband's equitable distribution
argument presented a "colorable claim under LaRue principles," but was inappropriate in the partition
action. A colorable claim under the statute for equitable distribution of the portion "given" to Mrs.
Hinton requires classifying it as marital and not separate property. This can be accomplished by
presuming transmutation both when separate money is spent to acquire or pay indebtedness on jointly
titled property and when it is deposited in a jointly titled account. No particular section of the statute
defines this as marital property. Consequently, equitable consideration of the two parties' contributions
to the property and a just, but not equal, division would be possible only if transmutation had
converted the property to marital for equitable distribution purposes.
31 See Hamstead, No. 16765 (AV. Va. Mar. 18, 1987). In O'Neill v. O'Neill, 600 S.W.2d 493
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980), the court believed the husband's testimony that expensive jewelry given to the
wife was a family investment. In contrast, in Townsend v. Townsend, 705 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986), in which the family benefit argument apparently was not made, household items including a
refrigerator, a stove, and a table and chairs, which the husband had given the wife on special occasions,
were classified as her separate property. See also Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, in which inherited jewelry
became the wife's separate property by gift from the husband.
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Surely, it would be in furtherance of the public policy underlying the entire equitable distribution system to give legal effect to all transactions evidencing intent
to enlarge the marital property category.
2.

Commingling

Another common method of evidencing transmutation is by commingling separate property with marital property so that the separate property can no longer
be traced and identified. This phenomenon is best understood by first concentrating on situations in which separate property is not commingled, i.e., exchange.
The statute provides that separate property includes "[p]roperty acquired during
marriage in exchange for separate property which was acquired before the marriage." ' An exchange is obvious if a spouse trades a gold coin owned prior to
the marriage for a different gold coin, or for a subdivision lot. Exchange traces
the separate property into the newly acquired property so that one can continue
to identify the separate contribution.
Complications arise when there is not an "even" trade because then marital
property and separate property are combined in order to acquire the new asset.
When real property is involved, courts applying the source of funds rule have
held that record keeping is sufficient tracing to identify the portion of the acquired
property which was obtained in exchange for the separate property." That portion
and its increase in value will be classified as separate. When the exact amount
of separate funds expended on the newly acquired property is known, the source
4
of funds rule then classifies that portion as separate property.
In contrast, commingling occurs when tracing is impossible. When one spouse
combines his or her separate property with marital property so that it is impossible
to determine what amount had been separate, the exchange definition cannot be
applied." The separate property may be added to the value of marital property

32

NV. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(f)(2) (1986).

33Use of transmutation theory in states that follow the inception of title theory or that have
not adopted source of funds is beyond the scope of this Article. For example, South Carolina appears
to be using transmutation beyond its meaning of intent to benefit the marital estate. See, e.g., Trimnal
v. Trimnal, 287 S.C. 495, 339 S.E.2d 869 (1986). This was the early experience in Illinois as well.
This writer believes that courts take this approach to ease the harshness of the inception of title rule
which denies to the marital estate any increase in value of marital funds invested in separate property.
-' Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70. The operation of uncommingling combined funds by tracing is illustrated in Caldwell v. Caldwell, 350 S.E.2d 688 (NV. Va. 1986). The wife had brought $25,000 to the
first marriage which was used in purchasing the first marital home and the proceeds of that home
were used in purchasing a second marital home. The parties agreed to divide this property so that
exchange or commingling never became an issue. However, the court noted that the wife had carried
into the marriage assets worth $25,000. Had the exchange issue been litigated, she could have claimed
at least $25,000 as her separate property (so long as transmutation had not occurred) because she
could trace her $25,000 into the purchased home.
Is See, e.g., McHugh v. McHugh, 108 Idaho 347,352 n.6, 699 P.2d 1361,1366 n.6 (1985).
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or may be combined with marital funds to acquire another item of property. In
either case, the normal definition of marital property as that acquired during
marriage without regard to title applies. One may assume that the separate property owner was considering the welfare of the marital unit and furthering partnership objectives.16 The commingling spouse has transmuted the formerly separate
property to marital.
Some decisions reveal a troubling uncertainty involving the commingling of
nontangible property as to whether the inability to trace the property or the fact
of combining itself causes transmutation. Combining separate and marital funds
to acquire investments, such as certificates of deposit and shares of stock, often
results in classifying the entire amount as marital. This procedure is in accord
with the transmutation theory of intending to benefit the marital estate when it
is impossible to trace the amount of separate funds.
In Missouri, an early appellate opinion held that a man who combined the
proceeds from sales of stock owned prior to the marriage with proceeds from
sales of stock purchased after the marriage and who, apparently, could not account for the precise amount of proceeds from his separate stock, had transmuted
the separate property to marital property by commingling. 7 In two subsequent
Missouri cases,38 an investor spouse owned certificates of deposit which were separate property. She reinvested both the principal (separate property) and the interest (marital property) together in newly acquired certificates titled in her name
only. If she had kept careful records of the amount of principal invested each
time, that would have indicated an intent not to contribute those separate funds
to the marital estate. Record keeping is the sensible way to demonstrate intent
to isolate and keep separate the separate property.3 9 Yet, the Missouri courts have
not clarified whether it was inability to trace or the fact of combining alone that
transmuted. 40
If transmutation by commingling occurs, even though the amount of separate
funds can be traced, then solely combining marital and separate funds brings
about transmutation. The result is inconsistent with the theory of transmutation
and creates a far-reaching danger to separate property owners. If neither separate

- The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of transmutation is consistent with
the recognition of marriage as a partnership. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848,852.
Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
3" See, e.g., Goldberg v. Goldberg, 691 S.W.2d 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Cartwright v. Cartwright, 707 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
11An extreme case in which income from separate property was held separate rested on the
finding that the income from the separate property never was distributed or subject to the control
of the non-owner spouse. Wierman v. Wierman, 130 Wis. 2d 425, 387 N.W.2d 744 (1986).
41 Recently, the Nebraska Supreme Court emphasized the ability to identify. See Ross v. Ross,
219 Neb. 528, 364 N.W.2d 508 (1985). However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court emphasized combination rather than ability to trace and identify. See Quinn, 512 A.2d at 853.
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titling nor record keeping will negate transmutation, nearly all intangible separate
property will be converted to marital property, over a rather short period of time
4
through the common practice of reinvesting principal and income together. '
Hopefully, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals will clarify the issue of
whether combining or inability to trace evidences transmutation of separate funds
to marital.
3.

Use by the Marital Unit

Courts also have found that shared use of otherwise separate property converts or transmutes it to marital. This theory is consistent with the shared enterprise theory of marriage. Transmutation by use could manifest intent to confer
untitled property upon the marital estate in the same manner that joint titling
does for titled property. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a husband
who inherited household furniture from his father and placed the furniture in the
family home for use over most of a thirty-year marriage transmuted the furniture
to marital.4 2 Interestingly, the fact that he had placed some of the furniture in
storage meant that it retained its character as separate and also demonstrated the
intent to transmute that which was used. 43 In contrast, Missouri courts dealing
with titled property that remained titled in the separate owner's name but was
44
used for a family home held that transmutation did not take place.
A few decisions have extended transmutation to unusual business situations.
In Wanberg v. Wanberg,45 the parties operated rental properties which the husband brought to the marriage and which remained titled in his name. The court
found that the parties had improved and managed the property as partners demonstrating their intent to treat the specific holdings as joint property. Without
using the terminology of transmutation, courts have made similar classifications

"

This danger was recognized in regard to real property in Hall, 462 A.2d at 1181-82. The

former Illinois rule transmuted to marital any separate property upon which marital funds had been
spent, including real property, by considering any combination a commingling. In re Marriage of

Smith, 86 Ill.2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239. This holding was unworkable because it nearly eliminated the
category of separate property. See Gregory, Marital Property in Illinois: The Complexities Wrought
by the Presumption of Gift, Transmutation, and Commingling, 1982 S. Ill. L.J. 159; Kalcheim &
Shapiro, Transmutation and Commingling: The Supreme Court'sRebuttable Presumption of Marital
Property, 71 I1l. B.J. 220 (1982). Subsequent to Hall, the legislature changed the rule. See ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40 § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
•2 Quinn, 512 A.2d at 853.
" Other courts have found transmutation of titled property when it was used for the' family
home. See, e.g., Jenks v. Jenks, 294 Or. 236, 656 P.2d 286 (1982); Stevenson v. Stevenson, 680 P.2d
642 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).

" See Busby v. Busby, 669 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Cochenour v. Cochenour, 642
S.W.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Hauser v. Hauser, 625 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Stark
v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
4 Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568 (Alaska 1983).
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when one party devoted most of his time during a long marriage to earning a
livelihood by investments which began with property brought to the marriage.
Various rationales can justify this marital classification: intent to benefit the marital unit shown by commingling;6 increase in value all due to marital effort; 47 or
4
that profits represent income rather than increase in value.
IV.
A.

APPORTIONING MARITAL AND SEPARATE COMBINATIONS

Full Value Classified in Proportion to Contributions

The source of funds rule includes within marital property the increase in value
of separate property resulting from martial funds or work of the spouses. The
West Virginia Legislature adopted the source of funds rule; however, the statute
does not state the complete rule. The source of funds rule provides that the
character of property as marital or separate initially is determined in proportion
to the amount of funds or effort devoted to its acquisition or improvement. A
dynamic continuous process of acquisition as property is paid for or improved
is recognized. Therefore, the values originally acquired by the respective contributions are part marital and part separate.
The" true importance of the source of funds rule, however, is the different
effect it has from the inception of title rule on classification of the increase in
value of property acquired prior to marriage or by gift. The inception of title
rule would require the separate owner to reimburse the marital estate for marital
funds spent on it, but would classify all increase in value of originally separate
property as separate, thereby encouraging diversion of marital funds into separate
property. For example, in the fact situation described earlier in which land was
purchased prior to marriage under a contract for $20,000 but was worth $500,000
at dissolution, the entire increase in value would be classified as separate even
though three-quarters of the purchase price was paid with marital funds.
In contrast, the heart of the source of funds rule is that each estate enjoys
the increase attributable to its contribution. 49 Once the value of separate and
marital contributions is determined, the entire value is classified in proportion to
those contributions. In the fact situation stated, three-quarters or $375,000 of the
ultimate value would be marital and subject to division. Thus, the source of funds
rule promotes the partnership or shared enterprise theory of marriage by enabling

" Millington v. Millington, 259 Cal. App. 2d 896, 67 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1968).

11Brennan v. Brennan, 103 A.D.2d 48, 479 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1984) (dairy operation); Nolan v.
Nolan, 107 A.D.2d 190, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1985) (investments).
41 Sousley v. Sousley, 614 S.W.2d 942 (Ky. 1981).
" Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817; Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916; In re Marriage of Herr,
705 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
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the marital enterprise to benefit from the investment of its funds and effort.
Source of funds is a process for classifying property by considering the time
and method whereby property was acquired and disregarding the intent of the
parties. Of course, there is no need to determine source of funds if the parties
have evidenced their intent to treat the entire value as marital by transmutation.
Understandably, the West Virginia Legislature chose to emphasize in the statute the crucial increase in value aspect of the source of funds rule. Under the
statutory language, marital property includes increase in value of separate property
"which increase results from" marital funds or work. However, the first step in
the analysis is to determine the different, initial contributions of separate and
marital property or effort.5 0 Once the total value is classified into separate and
marital portions, then the proportionate increase in value also can be classified. 1
B.

Determining Contributions to Mortgaged Property

1. Interest Payments
The first contribution issue to consider in regard to mortgaged property is
whether interest payments are contributions toward the acquisition or increase in
value of the property to be divided. The Missouri Supreme Court described the
source of funds rule as dependent upon the source of funds "financing the
purchase' 5', 2 and defined "acquired" as the "ongoing process of making payment""3
for property. Either definition could justify treating interest payments as a source
54
of acquiring the property. This was done once by a California court of appeals;
however, the California Supreme Court overruled the decision in 1980 holding
that interest payments, like taxes and insurance, do not contribute to capital
investment. 5 The court noted that "[t]he value of real property is generally represented by the owner's equity in it, and equity value does not include finance
charges or other expenses incurred to maintain the investment. ' 5 6 Several other

11Failure to define the initial contributions creates one of the ambiguities in the West Virginia
statute which was noted by Ms. Crandall who suggested legislative amendment for clarification. See
Crandall, supra note 10, at 92.
11For example, in Caldwell, 350 S.E.2d 688, the wife contributed $25,000 of separate funds to
the purchase of property for $60,000. Marital funds paid off the remaining $35,000. Assuming the
property was titled in the wife's name, it should be classified 5/12 wife's separate property and 7/
12 marital property. It was sold for $85,000. This ultimate value should be classified 5/12 or $35,416
separate property and 7/12 or $49,583 marital property.
S2

Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817, 824.

Id. at 825.
Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 P.
In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366,
16Id. at 369, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr.
3d 848, 867, 710 P.2d 346, 356, 221 Cal. Rptr. 546,
App. 3d 1228, 224 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1986).

640 (1926).
618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980).
at 665; accord In re Marriage of Saslow, 40 Cal.
555-56 (1985); In re Marriage of Gowdy, 178 Cal.
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courts, like California, also take into account only payments which reduce prin7
cipal.1
The West Virginia statute specifically includes within marital property the
increase in the value of separate property which results from expenditure of marital funds "which reduces indebtedness against separate property, extinguishes
liens, or otherwise increases the net value of separate property."I s Because interest
payments do not increase net value in the sense of the equity, the legislative intent
appears congruent with the theory of the California Supreme Court. However,
the obligation to pay interest is indebtedness and is the largest portion of mortgage
payments during the early years of a loan. Consequently, it could be argued that
the statutory language requires interest payments to be considered in determining
the share of marital property. 9 The total amount of money spent, principal and
interest, would be used to determine the proportionate share of each in the equity.
Including interest payments as contributions would make a difference in the
total amount of marital property subject to division. Interest payments from both
separate and marital funds would be most likely when property was purchased
and partially paid for prior to marriage, and the mortgage debt was further reduced during marriage. Thus, if separate funds prior to the marriage had reduced
the principal significantly, so that later payments from marital funds included
less interest and more principal, considering both interest and principal payments
as contributions would increase the percentage or ratio contributed by the separate
funds. The effect would be a decrease in the amount subject to division as marital
property. Lessening the proportionate value of the marital contribution seems
contrary to the legislative goal reflecting the partnership nature of marriage.
Therefore, the more logical analysis is that the statutory language "reduce indebtedness," when construed in the context of payments which "increase the value

,1 See, e.g., Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70; Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981); Winter v. Winter, 712 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re Marriageof Herr, 705 S.W.2d
619. Compare, McHugh, 108 Idaho 347, 699 P.2d 1361, in which interest was not discussed but
results, so bizarre as to incite an unusual dissent, might be due to including interest payments in the
calculations.
W
V. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e)(2) (1986).
Crandall suggests that interest payments as reduction of debt could be included in the amount
of increase in value of the separate property which is marital. Crandall, supra note 10, at 93. This
writer disagrees. Interest payments cannot enlarge the amount of property to be classified and divided
because they do not enlarge any value. The "property" is the market value of the interests owned
by the parties, i.e., the equity. Although interest is part of the indebtedness, it is a cost of acquisition
which does not affect the value subject to division. Therefore, the only logical way in which interest
could affect the amount of separate or marital property is by changing the proportion of those
contributions to the actual value acquired. Because the ratio of interest in each monthly payment
changes over the life of the loan, a larger proportion of the early payments is interest. Crandall stated
that including interest payments would increase the marital pool. Crandall, supra note 10, at 93. This
would be true only if the marital funds were contributed early in the life of the loan.
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of separate property," was only intended to insure that payments which increase
equity of otherwise separate property would be classed as marital.
2.

Mortgage Remaining at Dissolution

The West Virginia statute requires a determination of the net value of marital
property. 60 Net value is determined by subtracting the amount of indebtedness
from the market value of the property. However, this equation does not tell one
how to account for the remaining payments. If both spouses are responsible for
retiring the debt or if the property is sold to extinguish the debt, no classification
problems exist. But when the debt was incurred by only one of the spouses prior
to the marriage or has been assumed by only one of them and remains to be
paid off after the marriage, that spouse may claim credit for the amount of the
remaining indebtedness as a separate contribution to acquire the property. She
not only may assert that what she has already paid from her separate funds should
be included in the amount of separate contribution, but what she will pay in the
future also should be included. In other words, this spouse may argue that the
total contributions to acquire the equity value should be based not on what has
actually been spent, but, on the6 1total purchase price, the unpaid part of which
is now represented by the loan.
Other courts, exemplified by Kentucky and Missouri, do not give credit for
the loan value as a nonmarital property contribution. 62 Consequently, the marital
pool is increased because the relative percentages change. Since credit would be
given only for the the amount of money already spent, the relative proportions

6'W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32(d)(1) (1986).

61In California, the economic value of the loan is considered part of the nonmarital contribution.
See In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662. The effect is to

increase the separate proportion of the property. As an example, modify the basic facts of Caldiwell,
350 S.E.2d 688. Assume that $10,000 remained outstanding on the loan for the $60,000 purchase
price. Assume that the wife, in addition to the $25,000 contribution of her separate funds, would be
solely obligated to pay off $10,000, thus, the total nonmarital contribution would be $35,000. The

marital payments had been $25,000. The relative percentages of the $60,000 would be nonmarital,
$35,000 or 58%, and marital, $25,000 or 42%. When these ratios are applied to the equity (market
value $85,000 minus $10,000 indebtedness), the separate property is $43,500 and the marital property
is $31,500.
Winter, 712 S.W.2d 423; Brandenburg,617 S.W.2d 871; Graham, Using Formulasto Separate
Marital and Non-MaritalProperty: A Policy Oriented Approach to the Division of Appreciated Property Upon Divorce, 73 Ky. L. J. (1985).
Although Kentucky does not do so, the loan amount should be credited to the marital estate

if, as part of the dissolution settlement, the debt is extinguished either with other marital funds or
by selling the property. See Porter & Ewing, Apportioning Maritaland NonmaritalAssets in a Single

Asset, 9 Ky. BENcH & B. (1983); Note, Equitable Distribution:Approaches to Apportionment, 87
W. VA. L. Rav. 95, 108 (1984).
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the loan amount which would be subsequently paid by the
would not include
63
separate owner.
If the nonmarital contribution was originally a gift to the contributing spouse,
the amount credited as a nonmarital contribution would be the fair market value
of the gift when contributed. For example, in In re Marriage of Herr,6 the husband's father transferred to the husband his interest in a farm upon which there
was a modest mortgage. Marital funds paid off the mortgage. The gift was the
husband's nonmarital contribution, valued when received.
Another situation in which market value rather than actual separate funds
spent can be used is when the separately contributing spouse paid part of the
purchase price prior to the marriage and there is evidence that the value also
increased prior to the marriage. In Winter v. Winter,65 the court held that the
nonmarital contribution would be the equity value (market value minus outstanding indebtedness) at the time of marriage. Both simplicity in determining the
relative shares of marital and separate property and the policy of increasing the
marital pool favor using actual expenditures or equity value at time of marriage
to calculate the nonmarital contribution.
C.

Apportioning Increase in Value of Separate Business

1. The Dilemma and Early Solutions
In dual property jurisdictions, property owned before marriage or acquired
by gift or inheritance during marriage is separate property. Lawyers should advise
business clients contemplating marriage and who want to keep prior owned or
inherited property separate to consider incorporating their business affairs. A real
estate developer, a cattle breeder, a stock and bond investor, or a proprietor of
a retail business each will sell and reinvest proceeds continually. Whenever property is turned over during marriage, the newly acquired investment will be marital
property unless tracing can meet the exchange definition of separate property.
However, if the assets are part of a corporation the property does not change
from separate to marital as assets are sold and purchased because only the shares
are the property of the spouse and they are not transferred. Incorporation is a
method to avoid tracing and many transmutation problems as well. An added
advantage of segregating the separate property is that many dual property statutes

63 In the Caldwell example, the wife's nonmarital contribution would be only the $25,000 she
had already contributed giving her a 50% share of the $75,000 equity, i.e., $37,500. Likewise, the

marital estate would be credited with $25,000 or one-half, resulting in $37,500 subject to division.
64 In re Marriage of Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619.

61 Winter, 712 S.W.2d 423; see also Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871; In re Marriage of Marsden,
130 Cal. App. 3d 426, 181 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1982).
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provide that increase in value of separate property is separate. In West Virginia,
any increase in value of separate property due to inflation or a change in market
value resulting from conditions outside the control of the parties is separate. 66 So
long as no efforts are devoted to the business, increases in value of separate
property remain separate.
Conflict arises when during the marriage the shareholder spouse devotes most
working efforts toward the separate business. When the business has been successful, its value will increase significantly. Historically, this situation created a
dilemma which defied satisfactory solution. A fundamental concept of community
property systems, that in recent times is reflected in the common law dual property
systems, is that whatever is acquired by the efforts of either or both parties is
community property. 67 In other words, the earning power of both spouses belongs
to the marital community. 68 The main philosophical underpinning of the partnership marriage system would be defeated if values acquired by efforts, skill,
and ability of a spouse were not recognized as part of the marital estate. 69 Therefore, in Spanish community property law, all earnings and increase in value were
community property. 70 Apparently due to influences from the common law, another fundamental concept developed early in most community property states:
increases in the value of separate property belong to the separate property owner. 7'
The clash of these two fundamental principles has been particularly acute when
the separate property is a business to which one or both spouses devote time and
effort. The increase in value is almost always due to both the efforts of the
shareholder spouse and general market conditions. 72 Uncertainties in measuring
the value of the input from either economic conditions or efforts renders apportionment of the increase in value and classification more difficult than determining separate and marital dollars contributed to acquisition of real property.
By the early 1920s, courts were reaching disparate results and no satisfactory rule
73
had been developed.
In 1962, Professor King analyzed and critiqued the variety of judicial solutions
that had been developed in the struggle to resolve this dilemma. 74 King criticized
the all community method because it deprived the separate property of its contribution; however, he also stringently criticized an all separate method as ineW. VA. CODE

§

48-2-1(0(6) (1986).

§ 11.1 (1971); Evans, Primary Sources
of Acquisition of Community Property, 10 CALIF. L. Ray. 271 (1921).
67

W. DEFuNmIx, PRINCIPLES or CoMMUNITY PROPERTY,

61See Michelson, 89 N.M. 282, 286, 551 P.2d 638, 642; In re Caswell's Estate, 105 Cal. App.
475, 288 P. 102 (1930). See also, materials cited at note 3, supra.
Evans, supra note 67, at 273.
King, The Challenge of Apportionment, 37 WASH. L. Ray. 483, 484 (1962).
7%Id.
70

72
71

74

Id.
Evans, supra note 67, at 284.
King, supra note 70.
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quitable because it gave the separate property a gain that had been earned by
the community. He noted that "[iif the husband is allowed to spend all his time
working on his separate property, the community might never accumulate any
community assets. The only satisfactory use of this system is in cases where the
'75
labor expended is so minute that the court should not consider it."
The reimbursement method, which only allows reimbursement to the community for the
marital efforts devoted to separate property, and thus, does not allow the community to share in the proportionate increase in value, also was unfair to the
community. An all or nothing method, labeled the principal contribution method
by King, classes the increase in value as either entirely separate or community
depending upon the principal contribution. King notes that this approach has an
added shortcoming: a small error in making the decision of which contribution
is primary will have a large effect in unjustly denying anything to the other estate.
The only virtue of this method is that it avoids a precise apportionment decision
on the basis of a more easily determined gross or rough estimate. The other
methods analyzed by Professor King all attempt to apportion the increase in value
between that caused by marital efforts, skill and ability, and that due to general
economic conditions.
The reasonable rate of return method attempts to give the separate property
owner a reasonable return on the separate property investment. California decisions applied this method when the increase in value was largely due to the
efforts of the spouses. 76 The method is designed to assure that the separate property which is developed by the community efforts receives something even though
most of the value should be classed as community. The court in Pereirav. Pereira,
which originated this method, said, that "[t]he increment being attributable to
the personal efforts of the husband belonged to the community.. .but without
capital he could not have carried on the business. 7 7 Thus, the reasonable rate
of return method implies "a decision that community efforts bear the predominate
responsibility for the increase in value. .... -7"When real property forms the separate estate, a reasonable rental is considered separate.7 9 Return figured as interest
on the value of the separate property is used for a wide range of businesses. In
California, the legal rate of interest was used in the absence of evidence that

71 King, supra note 70, at 486, criticizing In re Pepper's Estate, 158 Cal. 619, 112 P. 62 (1910)
(all separate constant efforts) overruled, In re Neilson's Estate, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962); but approves of In re Buchanan's Estate, 128 Cal. App. 489, 17 P.2d 1046 (1932)
(all separate but very small amount of work).
76 Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909); Randolph v. Randolph, 118 Cal. App. 2d
584, 258 P.2d 547 (1953).
Pereira, 156 Cal. at 7, 103 P. at 491.
, Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 126, 525 P.2d 314, 321 (1974); Comment, Never Marry a
Rich Man: The Lesson of Beam v. Bank of America, A CaliforniaApportionment Case, 13 SANTA
CL1ARA L. REv., 121, 124, 132 n.69 (1972) (Never Marry a Rich Man.).
7 See, e.g., Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010 (1944).
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special economic conditions rendered the investment more or less profitable. 0 For
example, in Randolph v. Randolph,8' the husband had spent all of his efforts
working in a separate floral business. The court approved awarding all the increase
to the community except for a return at the legal rate of interest of seven percent
to the separate property. The court said that they would use the legal rate of
interest unless the accruals actually attributable to the separate property were
proved different from that rate. King criticized this method because of litigation
over what rate should be used, indicating that evidence relating to the amount
of increase in value and economic conditions could justify a greater or lesser rate
of interest.8 2 King's main criticism of the rate of return method was that it avoids
actual apportionment of the full increase in value. 3 An important advantage of
the rate of return method, noted by King, is ease of application with a fair degree
of predictability of results.
The California cases developed the reasonable compensation method for situations in which the invested separate property contributed more than skills and
effort to the increase in value.14 This method was first applied in Van Camp v.
Van Camp,s5 in which the court described the husband at the time of the marriage
as a man of means, acting as general manager of a very successful seafood corporation which was organized long before the marriage. Although the court recognized the contribution of his skill and capacity, they noted that he had been
paid a very substantial salary during the marriage and concluded that, otherwise,
the increase in value was derived from the property. The court noted that the
wife was much younger than the husband and described their marriage as one
of convenience, thus, revealing its reason for not wishing to enlarge the community
estate any more than necessary. The reasonable compensation method leaves most
of the increase to the separate estate, assuring that the community will obtain at
least reasonable compensation for its efforts. In the reasonable compensation
method, which King labeled the "salary system," the court allocates a reasonable
compensation to the community for its labor. What is reasonable may or may

Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
1, Randolph, 118 Cal. App. 2d 584, 258 P.2d 547.
12King, supra note 70, at 489-90 (citing Logan v. Forster, 114 Cal. App. 2d 587, 250 P.2d 730
(1952)).
83 For example, if the rate chosen is too high and the legal rate of interest is likely to be spread
over extended periods of time (See Never Marry a Rich Man, supra note 78, at 132 n.69), so much
could be allocated to the separate property that the community gets insufficient or no credit for efforts
even if they undoubtedly improved the value of the enterprise. See, e.g., Beam v. Bank of America,
6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971); Price v. Price, 217 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 350 (1963).
8' Speer, 96 Idaho 119, 126, 525 P.2d 314, 321, in which the court said that using this method
"signals the court's determination that community efforts were not so essential to the growth as to
merit compensation beyond a just and reasonable salary"; See also King, supra note 70, at 489; Never
Marry a Rich Man, supra note 78, at 124, 132 n. 69.
15VanCamp v. VanCamp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921).
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not be larger than the amount actually drawn as salary depending upon whether
the court finds the salary paid was adequate recompense for the services performed. Several courts determine what is reasonable by what a comparable business would pay a person of the same level of responsibility, including bonuses
and fringe benefits.16 King noted that the salary system is seized upon by courts,
especially when the business is incorporated and there is evidence that economic
conditions contributed significantly to the increase, as an easy way to avoid the
difficult actual apportionment issue.Y King's heaviest criticism was that this system, like the reimbursement method, accords to the community only the reasonable value of the managerial services from the perspective of what similar
businesses would pay for them. The separate owner retains all the remaining
increase because the evidence shows that the separate property was the chief contributor. King pinpointed the unjustness in depriving the community of its share
in the "product," i.e., the increase in value actually due to the services.
The only method praised by Professor King was the mathematicalformula
method. This approach, used in tax cases, combines both the interest and salary
methods, allocating to the separate and community estates a share in the excess
increased value in proportion to their relative contributions.rs In Todd v.
McColgan, 9 state income tax was allocated between partners operating a separate
business and their spouses by using a formula to differentiate the portion of
increased Value due to the capital and that due to the efforts of the partners
neither of whom had ever had a salary or fixed compensation. The court approved
the process which it described:
First the defendant Commissioner estimated what would constitute a fair return
upon the separate capital investment under the particular circumstances of this
case and next estimated what would be a fair salary for the taxpayers for each
of the years in question. These figures so obtained were totalled and the percentage
of each to the total constituted the proportion of the distributable income attributable to capital and to services.9
96 Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314.
King, supra note 70, at 488 (citing as the leading case, VanCamp 53 Cal. App. 17, 19 P.
885, for acknowledgement that it was avoiding the "impossible" apportionment problem).
s' King, supra note 70, at 491.
' Todd v. McClogan, 89 Cal. App. 2d 509, 201 P.2d 414 (1949).
90 Id., affirming an 8% rate of interest rather than the 7% legal rate because the lumber business
had acquired and held a large inventory at the beginning of World War II when lumber was subject
to an inflationary spiral. In Todd v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1945), federal income
tax for these same partners was allocated. The opinion is valuable for setting out in detail the methodology used. The amount found by applying the interest rate to the average capital value during
each year in question was the separate property contribution and was described as the "capital base."
S6 Speer,

The court then determined the community contribution by determining "salaries for serv-

ices... annually for the base of the capital earnings." The dollar amounts of the two contributions
were then added together and the proportion that each had contributed to the total contributions
was determined. That proportion was used to allocate the entire undistributed increase in value between
the separate and community estates.
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King praised this mathematical formula method because it divides the increase
more fairly than any of the other methods and because it should lend stability
and predictability to apportionment. The method eliminates the unfairness of
allocating all the value in excess of either reasonable salary or reasonable rate of
return to the other estate by allowing proportionate sharing." However, the method
requires extensive evidence in order to establish both the reasonable rate of return
and reasonable compensation. Perhaps this is why the mathematical formula method
92
appeared only sparingly in early reported dissolution cases.
Finally, King listed the percentage and substantialjustice approachesin which
no particular method for apportionment was even suggested for the trial courts.
These early community property cases demonstrate clearly that the appellate courts
avoided favoring one of the conflicting theories over the other by refusing to
require a particular apportionment method. Of course, lack of predictability on
whether to further the interests of the community or the separate estate was the
result. Because relatively few divorce cases were litigated in those earlier times,
the impact of that ambiguity was slight. Because the number of marriage dissolutions has grown in modern times and as equitable distribution has spread
throughout the country, the uncertainty may be more untenable.
2. Modern Theories and Solutions
By the mid-1980s, nearly all dual property jurisdictions followed the rule that
an increase in value of separate property should be apportioned between the separate and marital estate depending upon whether economic forces or spousal efforts produced that increase. Among the community property states, Arizona, 93
in 1983, became the last state to eliminate the all or nothing method based on
primary contribution. 94 Only Texas 95 forthrightly continues to apply the strict inception of title reimbursement method that does not apportion the enhanced value
beyond reimbursement for the value of the contribution.
In the common law dual property jurisdictions, with rare exceptions,9 6 most
courts facing the issue require allocation to the marital estate of the increase due

91 See Jacobs v. Hoitt, 119 Wash. 283, 205 P. 414 (1922) (applying a somewhat similar formula).
9 Never Marry a Rich Man, supra note 78, at 125.
91 In re Marriage of Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 601 P.2d 1334 (1979), aff'd, 139 Ariz. 72, 676 P.2d
1130 (1983).
94 Id.

91 Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
96 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that because the statute includes only income from
separate property in marital property, all increase in the value of close corporations due to the husband's efforts over a 25-year marriage must be separate. Lancellotti v. Lancellotti, 481 A.2d 7 (R.I.
1984), criticized by, Note, Family Law, 19 SuFFoLK U. L. Rav. 427 (1985). All increase in value of
separate property is marital in Colorado and Pennsylvania. Anthony v. Anthony, 514 A.2d 91, 10203 (Pa. 1986).
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to marital funds or spousal effort. 97 They do so in spite of apparently clear statutory language which states that the increase in value of separate property is
separate. 98 Some courts acknowledge that they are applying the source of funds
rule. 99 In a few jurisdictions, courts have read this distinction into statutes which
33
In Wisconsin, after
allow division of jointly acquired or improved property.
in value of gifted
increase
classing
the court held that statutory words required
of
hardship, finding
basis
on
the
property as nonmarital, it authorized division
would
contribution
spouse's
nonowner
to
the
due
increase
that failure to divide the
10
an
property
separate
as
includes
The New York statute
constitute hardship.
such
appreciation
that
extent
to
the
"except
increase in value of separate property
02
is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse."' New York
courts have held that appreciation due to the owner spouse's effort also must be
marital property in order to recognize the portion contributed by the nonowner
spouse. 0

Strong policy reasons underlie such judicial modifications of statutory language."3 The stated reasons hark back to the fundamental concepts underlying
community property and equitable distribution. These common law courts, newly
acquainted with equitable distribution, are thinking freshly about what it means
for the law to recognize that marriage is a partnership. The hallmarks they note
are commitment of spousal effort to the marriage, spouses enabling and suljporting one another in their efforts, and spousal expectation of sharing gains
thereby jointly achieved.
A Pennsylvania trial judge emphasized commitment of effort and sharing
when he said that the cornerstone of equitable distribution is that the activities

97Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 261 (1985).
See, e.g., Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817; Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1983); Tibbetts, 406
A.2d 70; Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 344 S.E.2d 100 (1986); McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144,
327 S.E.2d 910, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985); Phillips v. Phillips, 73 N.C. App.
68, 326 S.E.2d 57 (1985) (describing increase in value due to effort as active appreciation and increase
due to economic conditions as passive appreciation).
99 Id.

See, e.g., Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk, 212 Neb. 730, 325 N.W.2d 832 (1982); Templeton
,00
v. Templeton, 656 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1982); Moyers v. Moyers, 372 P.2d 844 (Okla. 1962).
"I Plachta v. Plachta, 118 Wis.2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193 (1984).
102N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(d)(3) (McKinney 1986).
'°0Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986); Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699, 463 N.E.2d 15 (1984); Roffman v. Roffman, 124 Misc.
2d 636, 476 N-Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 465 N.Y.S.2d
475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1983). Contra Jolis
v. Jolis, 111 Misc. 2d 965, 446 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1980), aff'd, 98 A.D.2d 692, 470 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1983).
104 Presumably, the same policies lie behind the unusual specific statutory language in West
Virginia which defines marital property to include the increase in value of separate property due to
work and defines the increase in value of separate property as separate only to the extent the cause
is beyond the control of the parties.
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of either party during the marriage are considered taken on behalf of the marital
enterprise; therefore, the benefits of one spouse's labor should accrue to both
spouses. 05
New York's highest court, in Price, centered on enablement when it said:
The Equitable Distribution Law reflects an awareness that the economic success
of the partnership depends not only upon the respective financial contributions
of the partners, but also on a wide range of nonremunerated services to the joint
enterprise, such as homemaking, raising children and providing the emotional and
moral support necessary to sustain the other spouse in coping with the vicissitudes
of life outside the home.' 06
Earlier, in Roffman v. Roffman, a lower New York court eloquently described
commitment and enablement:
The concept of equitable distribution is a corollary of the principle that marriage
is a joint enterprise whose vitality, success and endurance is dependent upon the
conjunction of multiple components, only one of which is financial. The nonremunerative efforts of raising children, making a home, performing a myriad
of personal services and providing physical and emotional support are, among
other noneconomic ingredients of the marital relationship, at least as essential to
its nature and maintenance as are the economic factors, and their worth is consequently entitled to substantial recognition .... ,07
The inexorable conclusion to be drawn from these definitions is that partnership theory prevails in the distribution of the fruits produced through the
efforts of either spouse during marriage, since any efforts not directly related to
such production are deemed to have enabled the other spouse to engage in efforts
that were so related.108
A North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the enablement function of
the homemaker spouse as a reason for sharing the increase in value of separate
property due to effort when it said that:
[If the assets were immune] .

.

. even if the spouse who acquired them was only

able to do so because his or her spouse devoted time and money to maintaining
the household, enabling him or her to engage in profitable business dealings... then equitable distribution simply is no help to the person whose spouse
is a businessman or entrepreneur, who brings considerable corporate property into
the marriage, and acquires most of the assets used in the marriage by profitmaking manipulation of corporate funds.' 09

101Pascoe v. Pascoe, 11 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1091 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1984); Birkel v. Birkel,
9 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2191 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1982).
"I Price, 69 N.Y.2d at 14, 503 N.E.2d at 687, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
117Roffman, 124 Misc. 2d at 636, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 715 (quoting Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 465
N.Y.S.2d 475).
I- Id., 476 N.Y.S.2d at 715 (quoting Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 99, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 490).
'09 Phillips, 73 N.C. App. at 72, 326 S.E.2d at 60.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss4/11

24

Krauskopf: Classifying Marital and Separate Property--Combinations and Incre

1987]

MARITAL AND SEPARATE PROPERTY

1021

The Maine and Missouri Supreme Courts highlighted expectation of sharing
when they stated that the marital unit should share in values attributable to marital
funds and labor to prevent a sophisticated spouse from diverting marital funds
and effort to aggrandize separate property at the expense of the marriage and
the other spouse.110 Some judges have said specifically that the close corporation
shareholder, even with sound business decisions, should not be permitted to deprive the other spouse of a share in the fruits of the shareholder's labor.,
The dual property equitable distribution statutes of these states define marital
property as all property acquired during marriage and add an exception for property defined as separate;"12 therefore, these courts are relying on the principles of
partnership marriage to justify narrowly limiting the statutory exception for separate property. The effect is a broad construction of marital property to include
contributions by effort. The New York Court of Appeals in Price held that the
legislature, by so defining the terms, intended that marital property should be
broadly construed and the separate property exception narrowly construed "in
order to give effect to the economic partnership concept of the marriage relationship recognized in the statute.11 3 Once a court holds that apportionment of
the increase in value of separate property is required in order to further the values
of partnership marriage, appropriateness of methods for apportionment should
be measured by their effectiveness in advancing that goal.
The burden of proof on the issue of whether an increase in value of separate
property during the marriage is due to efforts or economic conditions is rarely
discussed. However, there is a clear split of authority along the lines of the original
dilemma. Some courts recognize that the increased value in itself is property acquired during marriage and apply the underlying presumption that property acquired during marriage is community or marital." 4 Therefore, in the absence of
evidence that general economic conditions caused a natural or inherent enhancement in the value of the separate property, the entire increase is presumed to be
due to effort and classed as marital. This approach favors the community" 5 and

110Hoffmann,

676 S.W.2d 817; Hall, 462 A.2d 1179.
M McLeod, 74 N.C. App. at 151; 327 S.E.2d at 915 (quoting Hoffman, 676 S.E.2d at 830
(Blackmar, J. concurring in part)).
M See, e.g., U.M.D.A. § 307 (1970); Farn. Law Rep. (BNA) Desk Guide to the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act 57 (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (Vernon 1986); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236(B)(5)
(McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a) (1981); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 401(d) (Purdon

1986).
M Price, 503 N.E.2d at 687, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 222 (citing Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d
15, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699).
"' In re Marriage of Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 601 P.2d 1334; Cord v. Cord, 98 Nev. 210, 644
P.2d 1026 (1982); Downs v. Downs, 410 So. 2d 792 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 414 So. 2d
375 (burden to rebut on separate owner after evidence that efforts did contribute); Deliberto v. Deliberto, 400 So. 2d 1096 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
M Jacobs, 119 Wash. 283, 205 P. 414.
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the partnership aspect of the marriage relation by treating the increase as any
other exception to the presumption and placing the burden on the separate property owner." 6 Adopting the source of funds rule that the process of acquisition
is an ongoing process, so that the increase is property acquired during marriage,
seems to demand this result. As one writer noted, placing the burden of proof
on the party seeking to establish that some part of the income should be credited
to the community is inconsistent with the substantive
presumption that all property
7
acquired during marriage is community."
Many other courts have placed the burden on the community or the nonowner
spouse to show that efforts, rather than economic conditions, produced the increase."' Sometimes, the courts rely upon the specific statutory language that the
increase in value of separate property is separate. By viewing the increase as part
of the property already classed as separate, courts avoid the marital property
presumption." 9 This appears inconsistent with the source of funds philosophy and
more congruous with the inception of title reasoning.
The West Virginia statute is unusual. It defines increase by work as marital
and increase due to market conditions as separate. Yet, these definitions do not
suggest who should have the burden of proof. The subsection setting out the
general definition of marital property as all property acquired during the marriage
concludes by stating, "except that marital property shall not include separate
property as defined in subsection (f)of this section ....,,'0 Subsection (d)(6)
defines the increase in value of separate property due to market conditions as
separate property. Implicit in these provisions is a legislative intent that the latter
be construed as an exception to a basic presumption that property acquired during
marriage is marital.'21 Thus, all increase in separate property should be classed
as marital unless the separate property owner sustains the burden of showing that
the increase is due to market conditions beyond the control of the parties.
Beam v. Bank of America,'22 decided by the California Supreme Court in
1971, heralded the modern era in community property states by stating that California courts had in their long history of litigating the issue of increase in value
of separate businesses during marriage used one of two alternative methods: reasonable rate of return or reasonable compensation depending on the ciroumstances

116

Cf. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (broadly'construing marital prop-

erty to promote the economic partnership concept).
"17 Never Marry a Rich Man, supra note 78.
M'See, e.g., Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817; In re Marriage of Elam, 97 Wash. 2d 811, 650 P.2d.
213 (1982); Michelson, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638; In re Ney's Estate, 212 Cal. App. 2d 891, 28
Cal. Rptr. 442 (1963).
In re Ney's Estate, 212 Cal. App. 2d 891, 28 Cal. Rptr. 442.
W. VA.
"'

2

CODE

§ 48-2-1(e)(1).

Cf. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219.
Beam, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137.
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of the case. The court affirmed the apportionment made after applying both
methods and thereby avoided ruling on which method was appropriate under the
facts. Nevada, in 1973, and Arizona, in 1983, also held that apportionment was
required but specified no particular method.123 The Idaho Supreme Court, in Speer
v. Quinlin,124 although noting that there was no predominate pattern for apportioning in the community property states, adopted a newly restrictive method
which limited the community to reasonable compensation apparently without regard to whether property or effort was the chief contributor to the increase in
value. The mathematical formula method of proportionate sharing apparently is
no longer used in modern dissolution cases.
In the common law states, activity has been sparse with no clear choice of
a single apportionment method being utilized. The decision in Hoffman'"
apparently placed the burden of proof on the nonowner spouse as to whether
efforts did increase the value and, when evidence indicated that the increase
was due largely to economic conditions, limited the marital estate only to
reasonable compensation for efforts. 2 ' There appear to be no other recent
appellate court decisions adopting a particular method of apportionment. 27
Surely, there will be more litigation in the common law states on apportioning
increase in value of separate business interests in the future. Presently, confusion
abounds both in the community property and the common law jurisdictions because the appellate courts have not articulated the basis upon which trial courts

"IIn Johnson v. Johnson, 89 Nev. 244, 510 P.2d 625 (1973), the Nevada Supreme Court said
courts could select whichever of the two methods "will do substantial justice" and affirmed a judgment
apportioning a reasonable rate of return to the separate property owner and the remainder to the
community. Later, in Cord, 98 Nev. 210, 644 P.2d 1026, the Nevada court affirmed finding all increase
separate because none was attributable to effort. Although expert witnessses for both sides used the
rate of return method, the court did not rule on the propriety of doing so. In in re Marriage of
Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 601 P.2d 1334, the Arizona court affirmed a finding, using the reasonable
compensation method, that $75,000 of the $79,000 increase in value was community property and
held that the trial court was not bound by any one method to determine reasonable rental, reasonable
rate of return, and reasonable compensation.
124 Speer, 96 Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314; see also Mifflin v. Mifflin, 97 Idaho 895, 556 P.2d 854
(1976).
115Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817; See also Heilman v. Heilman, 700 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc).
1
See discussion, infra notes 163-177 and accompanying text.
' Two decisions held that economic conditions caused the increase and added that minimal
spousal efforts had been sufficiently compensated. See Van Newkirk, 212 Neb. 730, 325 N.W.2d 832
(1982); Templeton, 656 P.2d 250; see also Schweizer v. Schweizer, 55 Md. App. 373, 462 A.2d 462,
cert. granted, 298 Md. 49, 468 A.2d 1013, aff'd in part, 301 Md. 626, 484 A.2d 267 (1983). Cf.
Plachta, 188 Wis. 2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193 (home appreciated due to general economic conditions
only). One opinion without discussion, citation, or full statement of facts affirmed the trial court's
award of 40% of the increase in value of a retail business to the wife after finding that she had
contributed 40% of the increase through her own efforts. Caldwell, 17 Mass. App. 1032, 461 N.E.2d
834 (remanded for findings on value).
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should use one or another of the familiar methods. What fact patterns cause one
method rather than another to "do substantial justice" have not been delineated
at the appellate level. After considering the effect of common approaches in view
of the policies underlying community property and equitable distribution systems,
this Article will suggest a new approach.
3. Critique of Modem Decisions
Courts often hold the entire increase in value separate. In these cases community effort, especially managerial effort, is so minimal as to be insignificant
in affecting the value. 28 A recent California decision, In re Ney's Estate,'19 continued the pattern of looking for active management efforts in order to class the
value as community. In this case, the husband had retired with investments in
the stock market. For fourteen years, he read the Wall Street Journal, visited his
broker once a week when in town, and sold stock approximately once a month." 0
The court held that the modest increase was not due to his skill. In a 1982 decision,
the Nevada Supreme Court upheld allocating all the increase in value to separate
property when evidence from several witnesses established the shareholder's declining health, management by others, and inflation. The appeals court thus upheld the trial court's finding that the shareholder had no active participation in
the business and that "any increase... was attributable to other managers or
general economic conditions.''3 The Idaho Court affirmed allocation to the separate estate when financial statements and testimony from accountants and a
banker supported a finding that the increase was not due to labor. 3 2 Recent
decisions from common law states involving real property rest on findings that
inflation was the principal factor causing an increase in value and that the effort

128 Early California cases are illustrative. See Harrold v. Harrold, 43 Cal. 2d 77, 271 P.2d 489
(1954); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 45 Cal. 2d. 142, 287 P.2d 769 (1955) (evidence showed new car dealerships
after World War II were staffed by competent well-trained personnel; the shareholder spouse did not
take part in the routine operations or worked only short hours, was frequently absent on extended
vacations, and was primarily concerned with policy matters; ample compensation was taken).
See also Logan, 114 Cal. App. 2d 587, 601, 250 P.2d 730, 738 (evidence showed most increase
was due to the capital and its managers; shareholder had no office at the plant and only visited it
sporadically, spent most of her time at home or in travel; shareholder had the manager at her home
for dinner twice a week when she was home and obtained reports from him but made no significant
business decisions; substantial sums in dividends and salary were withdrawn).
In re Ney's Estate, 212 Cal. App. 2d 891, 28 Cal. Rptr. 442.
J0 The court also noted that during that time the DOW Jones average on industrial stocks rose
from 207.69 to 582.69 but the value of the investor's shares had not quite doubled and that there
was no evidence that he had special investment skill or ability. Id. at 898, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
" Cord, 98 Nev. 210, 644 P.2d 1026. See also Smith v. Smith, 94 Nev. 249, 578 P.2d 319 (1978)
(overruled as to burden of proof in Cord).
",2 Mifflin, 97 Idaho 895, 556 P.2d 854; see also Michaelson, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638 (no
proof of amount or value of contribution by spousal labor).
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involved was not a significant cause.' 33 The Maryland Court of Appeals held that
the alleged effect on the increased value of a corporation by a shareholder's
decisions
as a member of a board of directors was "too tenuous and specula34
tive.'''
These decisions clarify that the threshold inquiry is whether the time and
effort expended, in fact, did contribute to the increase in value of the corporation.
If it did not, there is no value attributable to the community to apportion. However, if the burden of proof is on the separate property owner, he must present
evidence in regard to day-to-day management efforts and, if possible, opinions
of experts to show that his services did not affect the value.'35 The community
is still entitled to compensation for work in the separate business whether or not
that work increased value. This explains why a court refers to having been compensated for efforts even after it finds that efforts did not significantly affect
value.
In re Marriageof Lopez,'36 which involved a law practice, is a good example
of a service profession in which little property exists to contribute significantly
to the increase in value of the business. It is not surprising that the California
court in Lopez attributed all the increase during the marriage to the effort and
skill of the spouse. Similarly, a court held that the equipment in a "one man"
welding business was essential to the business but did not in any sense constitute
137
a contribution to capital and affirmed an allocation entirely to the community.
Another illustrative community property decision is Downs v. Downs3 , in which
the husband had been the managing partner in a furniture business devoting all
his work efforts to it during the twenty-six year marriage. The Lousiana Appeals
Court upheld classifying all the increase in value as community in that it was
obvious the growth and prosperity of the business was largely attributable to his
capable management of its affairs.
A few recent decisions in Kentucky and New York follow this pattern. The
crucial fact in each is that the separate property owner spouse devoted all working
"I Plachta, 118 Wis. 2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193; Van Newkirk, 212 Neb. 730, 325 N.W.2d 832
(1982); Templeton, 656 P.2d 250; see also Midyett v. Midyett, 206 Okla. 312, 243 P.2d 650 (1952)
(discovery of oil). See also Halpern v. Halpern, 13 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1187 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1987).
13, Schweizer, 55 Md. App. 373, 462 A.2d 562.
This consideration is not clear in Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817. The court said that the increase
in value was "directly attributable" to legislative enactments (Clean Water Acts) affecting economic
conditions and only said that the efforts for which he was compensated "had an impact on the
increase in value." Id. at 825-26. If the burden of proof that efforts were the primary contribution
to the increase in value is on the nonowner spouse, the technical holding of the case may be that
the evidence was insufficient to make that finding. See Krauskopf, The Transmutation and Source
of Funds Rules in Division of Marital Property, 50 Mo. L. REv. 759,787 (1985).
136In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974).
13, Austin v. Austin, 190 Cal. App. 2d 45, 11 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1961) (affirming allocation entirely
to the community).

M Downs, 410 So. 2d 792.
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efforts and time during the marriage to the business enterprise. The courts find
the property inconsequential to the value of the business at dissolution even though
the separate property was originally the focus of the owner's efforts. The growth
in value is described as a product of the marital partnership due to the active
efforts of one or both spouses.
InBrennan,'39 the husband had twenty years earlier brought to the marriage
a small herd of dairy cattle. The New York Appellate Division Court held the
prosperity and growth of the present dairy operation valued at $90,000 occurred
through the mutual efforts of the parties over the twenty-year period and classified
the entire operation marital property.
In Roffman,' 40 the value of a furniture business started by the husband three
years prior to the marriage had been the sole subject of his efforts over the entire
thirty-two year marriage. The court held that the growth in the business was
marital property and not merely an appreciation in separate property. The court
stated:
Therefore, the term "increase in value of separate property" does not apply to

the growth and evolution of a business venture that was the primary economic
foundation of a lengthy marriage.

.

.to do... [otherwise] would effectively elim-

inate the concept of the "economic partnership" of marriage in certain marriages
merely because an ultimately successful business venture was started by one party
prior to the marriage.
14

In Nolan v. Nolan,'42 a second New York Appellate Division Court held that
the increase due to the husband's active management of investments, to which
he devoted his efforts after leaving a salaried job, was marital property. The court
commented that the contribution of the homemaker was no less significant than
when the husband had been salaried, saying that: "[fn both situations the income,
in the form of wages or appreciation, is attributable to some degree to the marital
partnership.' ' 143 Apparently, these two New York cases were settled without further litigation; however, Nolan was cited with approval by the New York Court
of Appeals in Price'" for having recognized that increase in value due to efforts
must be available for the homemaker spouse to share.
In 1981, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Sousley,1 41 classed the "profit"
from the sale of an incorporated retail store owned prior to a short marriage as

Brennan, 103 A.D.2d 48, 479 N.Y.S.2d 877.
Roffman, 124 Misc. 2d 636, 476 N.Y.S.2d 713.
141 Id. at 639, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16.
142Nolan v. Nolan, 107 A.D.2d 190, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1985).
" Id. at 193, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
Price, 69 N.Y.2d at 18, 503 N.E.2d at 689, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
Sousely, 614 S.W.2d 942.
13

140
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income, not an increase in value of separate property. The key factor in treating
this corporate profit as income to the husband was that he earned his living from
buying, improving, and selling real estate and businesses; therefore, the court
characterized the profit on sale of the business as income from his "stock in
trade."' 6 The decision may be questionable for not allocating any portion to the
separate property.
Protecting the marital partnership's claim on the efforts of the spouses is a
powerful public policy. In these New York and Kentucky decisions, one can see
the influence of the commitment, enabling, and sharing components of the marriage partnership concept. These rulings indicate that separate origins or business
form will not be exalted over substance when it is obvious that spousal efforts
were devoted exclusively to the enterprise that produced the value. The courts
are concerned that the commitment of effort to family welfare expected of a
marital partnership not be subverted. This concern is warranted when all efforts
of one spouse have been devoted to the business enterprise. It would be fair to
assume that the other spouse supported and enabled those endeavors because both
individuals expected the increase in value to benefit the marriage partnership. The
modem courts heightened concern with protection of the marital partnership is
so strong that they discount as inconsequential the original input from separate
property. These decisions suggest that a married person who devotes his or her
full working time to the separate estate may have a heavy burden in demonstrating
that the enhancement in the property's value during the marriage is due to economic conditions wholly apart from the efforts.
In contrast to merely apportioning the increase in value of shares of an appropriately managed business, courts may reach corporate assets because of manipulative business practices. These are not simply apportionment of increase in
value cases and would not require finding an increase in value of the corporation
at all. They are discussed here because ignoring the corporate form furthers the
policy of classifying as marital all that is acquired by marital effort. However,
unlike apportionment of increase in value, either tapping retained earnings or
piercing the corporate veil requires special findings.
To classify retained earnings as marital property requires finding the shareholder spouse was in a position to influence corporate decisions about salary,
bonuses, and dividends and that earnings due to the spouse's efforts were retained
as a result of that influence. 147 Power to control disposition of corporate earnings,
not an increase in value, is necessary. The policy of protecting earnings created
48
by marital effort was apparent when the Delaware Supreme Court in J.D.P.1

1,1
Id. at 943.
,,7
Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817; J.D.P. v. F.J.H., 399 A.2d 207 (Del. 1979) (discussed in, Krauskopf, supra note 135, at 789-90); Simplot, 98 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d 844; Brazier v. Brazier, 111 Idaho
692, 726 P.2d 1143 (1986).
149 J.D.P., 399 A.2d 207.
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said that to prevent retained earnings from being classified as marital property
would invite evasion of the property division law. It held whether to classify the
earnings as marital would depend upon consideration of various factors including
whether the earnings were retained for ordinary business reasons or for the purpose of preventing the earnings from becoming marital property. This approach
failed in Jols 49 in which evidence showed the need for large amounts of capital
in the diamond business and that an excess had never been found in Internal
Revenue Service annual audits. 50 In contrast to the apportionment approach,
tapping retained earnings depends upon the reason for retaining earnings and
shareholder influence on the decision.' 5'
When a shareholder spouse controls the corporation and uses it extensively
for his personal and family expenses, the corporate form may be ignored by
piercing the corporate veil. This approach is seldom successful because it requires
finding that the controlling shareholder used the corporation as his alter ego for
purposes of diverting marital funds to his personal benefit. 5 2 Lawing v.Lawing 53
illustrates that the corporate form can be ignored in order to reach specific property. The husband shareholder had dominated the corporation and used it extensively to provide for the family needs with little accountability. Shares in
unrelated corporations titled in the husband's name had been purchased with
corporate funds. The court held they were actually compensation to the husband
and marital property. 154 The court also recognized the corporate form as legitimate
for other purposes and, therefore, apportioned the increase in value of the shareholder's shares between that attributable to active efforts and that due to passive
s
economic conditions.
When the evidence indicates that both spousal efforts and economic conditions
have contributed to the increase in value of the separate property, most decisions
since the early 1960s apply either the rate of return or reasonable compensation
methods for apportionment. However, there is a dearth of discussion about the
effects of various methods and their relevance to the underlying marriage part-

Jolis, 98 A.D. 692, 470 N.Y.S.2d 584.
110Contrast, Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 827, in which the court said it was without jurisdiction
14

to determine the reasonably anticipated needs of the business. Discussed in Krauskopf, supra note
135, at 790-91.
" See McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910 (sound corporate decision might deprive
spouse of a share of the fruits of the shareholder's labor; remand for determination of increase in
value due to active efforts).
312 Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d at 826 n.7 (distinguishing the instant case because the spouse did not
have a controlling interest in the corporation and his financial dealings were in accordance with good
business practices); Mifflin, 97 Idaho 895, 556 P.2d 854 (1976); Dillingham v. Dillingham, 434 S.W.2d
459 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968); Uranga v. Uranga, 527 S.W.2d 761 (rex. Ct. App. 1975).
113

1

Lawing v. Lawing, 344 S.E.2d 100 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
at 107.

Id.

"I Id. at 112.
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nership policy of community property and equitable distribution systems.
The reasonable return on separate property method, which originated for use
when the chief contributing factor to the increase in value was effort, has experienced problems. Its purpose was merely to give the separate property some
56
return. Yet, in Price v. Price,"
when the court applied the seven percent legal
rate of interest, it found no excess to attribute to the community. That is a strange
result for a method in which the court found that the predominate cause of the
increase was effort. The shortcomings of using the legal rate of return were even
more evident in Beam'5 7 in which the husband had not been employed for twentynine years but, instead, devoted all his time to handling his inherited property.
There was little increase in the value of the property itself because he had chosen
to invest it in tax-free government bonds which returned only one percent. One
commentator attacked the use of the legal rate of return for long-term business
investments, arguing that a normal business cycle would not allow for such return. ' 8 In response, the California courts would reason that evidence can be used
to show that the legal rate is inappropriate for businesses of this type.15 9 The
Beam court used an incorrect standard when it applied the rate someone else
would have obtained by investing the property. The danger of inappropriately
ignoring factors such as tax advantages is apparent in Beam in that the separate
owner deliberately chose a lesser return for tax purposes. The court should have
held that tax advantages were evidence that an appropriate rate should have been
one percent. The decision is justly criticized for eliminating all the increase actually
16
attributable to his efforts. 16° The reasonable return method is still used in Nevada 1
and California, but it is apparent that the legal rate of interest is not always
applied.162
To further both its original purposes and the concept of partnership marriage,
the reasonable return method is useful primarily when evidence indicates an increase in value largely due to efforts, but there is clearly also a significant con-

,16 Price v. Price, 217 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1963).
Beam, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137, 490 P.2d 257.
", Never Marry a Rich Man, supra note 78.
Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13, 432 P.2d 709; Randolph, 118 Cal. App. 2d 584,
258 P.2d 547 (1953).
110Never Marry a Rich Man, supra note 78. This article also criticizes it for assuming that
community expenses were paid out of the increase. Later cases have declined to follow those statements
when income had already paid for community expenses. In re Marriage of-Frick, 181 Cal. App. 3d
997, 226 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1986).
161Cord, 98 Nev. 210, 644 P.2d 1026; Johnson, 89 Nev. 244, 510 P.2d 625.
1 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Frick, 181 Cal App. 3d 997, 226 Cal. Rptr. 766, holding the
rate of return method appropriate when the increase in value was due in large part to labor, but
affirming less to the separate property than the legal rate of interest. See also 4 Fed. Tax Coordinator
2d (Res. Inst. Am.) § A-5107 (1985), stating that when income of separate business is primarily due
to services, the portion allocable to separate capital is made on the basis of a reasonable return on
a long-term, well-secured investment.
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tribution from the property. Then the return method at one time credits the
marital estate with most of the increase but respects the input of the separate
property by assuring that some of the increase will be apportioned to the separate
estate. From the perspective of the separate property owner, this might aid situations like Sousley-a short marriage in which evidence is probably readily available concerning the value of the separate property at the beginning of the marriage
and in which the separate property was the focus of productive spousal efforts.
However, in accord with protecting the fruits of spousal effort for the marital
partnership, this method allows all the remaining increase to be classed as marital.
Significantly, no limit is put on the amount of increase due to efforts that can
be classed as marital. Consequently, when a reasonable rate of return is carefully
determined by accounting for the limitations of the particular investor, this method
best credits the marital partnership with the full fruits of its efforts. A different,
but no less important advantage in times of increased dissolution litigation, is
that apportionment is relatively easy since only a reasonable return on the property
need be determined.
Paradoxically, the reasonable compensation method developed as a measure
of spousal effort when enhancement of the separate property was the chief contributor to the increase in value. In the 1960s, California appellate courts affirmed
the reasonable compensation method only after noting evidence that the increase
in value was largely due to economic conditions.', 3 However, in Beam,164 the
California Supreme Court emphatically stated that either method of apportionment could be used, referring obliquely to finding which was the chief contributor,
but avoiding the issue of when each method should be used.' 65 Apparently, desire

M In Berry v. Berry, 117 Cal. App. 2d 624, 256 P.2d 646 (1953), evidence showed profits on
the sale of property due to World War II inflation; community earnings due to effort. In Tassi v.
Tassi, 160 Cal. App. 2d 680, 325 P.2d 872 (1958), evidence showed high profits in the meat business
following World War II and the Korean War; fully one-third of the customers were generated prior
to the marriage.
In Owens v. Owens, 219 Cal. App. 2d 856, 33 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1963), the husband incorporated
his successul sole proprietorship the day before the marriage and devoted his full time to the business

during the marriage, but the evidence supported trial court findings that increase in value was largely
due to inflation and the faithful service of employees. In Somps v. Somps, 250 Cal. App. 2d 328,
58 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1967), the shareholder spouse had withdrawn extensive sums as compensation for
his considerable efforts; but the evidence also showed unprecendented population growth creating
demands for the engineering services and services of others in the business which contributed to its
increase in value.
Millington, 259 Cal. App. 2d 896, 67 Cal. Rptr. 128, should be distinguished from all others

because the court upheld finding the increase largely attributable to management activities, yet allowed
all the increase to be classed as community because of retained earnings and commingling.
16

Beam, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137, 490 P.2d 257.

165Id. at 18, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 141, 490 P.2d at 261. Since the increase was minimal over 29
years one could fairly attribute it to inflation on the original inheritance, but the court did not state
that such evidence warranted the reasonable compensation method. In fact, it made one highly questionable reference in dicta that suggested it would be appropriate to use the rate of return method
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to provide trial courts with flexibility has discouraged stating that a sine qua non
to the reasonable compensation method was increase chiefly due to property enhancement. Consequently, California courts have continued to use either method
without restriction from their supreme court. 16
Outside of California, the reasonable compensation rule has sometimes been
applied differently with adverse effects on the goal of protecting all property
developed by spousal effort for the marital estate. A serious misapplication of
the reasonable compensation method can occur when it is not differentiated from
the reimbursement method. This is best understood by analyzing the Texas Supreme Court opinions in Jensen. 67 The state follows a reimbursement rule, not
a source of funds or apportionment rule, for community funds and efforts devoted
to separate property. In its first opinion, which was later withdrawn, 168 the court
allowed all the increase in value of the corporation due to spousal efforts to the
community. In the second opinion, the court reaffirmed the reimbursement rule,
holding that reasonable compensation for the time and effort was the community
share. The court contrasted "community ownership" theory which it said holds
that any increase in the value of the stock as a result of the time and effort of
the owner spouse becomes community property. In the third modified opinion,
the court indicated that enhanced value of the stock could be considered as a
factor in determining reasonable compensation, thereby solidifying its holding that
only what the market would pay for services and not what those services produced
was relevant to the reimbursement method.169 The court noted that the reimbursement "rule will obviate the need for the trial court to undertake the onerous
and quite often impossible burden ...

of attempting to determine just what fac-

tors actually contributed to the increase in value of the stock and in what proportion."170
The contrast with the California rule is dramatic. The California courts limit
to reasonable compensation only when the chief contributor to the increase in
value is economic forces on the separate property. The "community ownership"
theory Jensen referred to is actually the California reasonable rate of return method
which allows all increase over that reasonably attributable to the property to go
to the community. The Texas reimbursement method deprives the community of

when the increase was due to the property. That, of course, would not be consistent with any of the
preceding decisions. "We cannot.. .condemn. . .the judge's implicit decision that the modest increment... was more probably attributable to the 'character of the capital investment' than to the 'personal activity."' Id. at 20, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 142, 490 P.2d at 262.
'11 As late as 1986, the rate of return method was applied when the increase in value of a business
was largely due to labor. See In re Marriageof Frick, 181 Cal. App. 3d 997, 226. Cal. Rptr. 766.
Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107.
's Jensen v. Jensen, 9 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2581 (Tex. 1983).
"6 Weekley, Appreciation of a Closely Held Business Interest Owned Prior to Marriage: Is it
Separate or Community Property?, 11 Com. PROP. J. 257, 271 (1984).
110Jensen, 665 S.W.2d at 109.
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value it creates in excess of market compensation for the services rendered.17 '
Only the traditional California application of the two methods gives the marriage
partnership protection for the value produced by marital effort.
Two decisions illustrate that courts may actually apply the reimbursement
system but label it reasonable compensation. In Speer, 172 the Idaho Supreme Court
recognized that California courts used the reasonable compensation method when
separate property was the chief contributor to the increase in value. Based on
legislative intent that the separate property "not be assimilated" into the community, the court held that fair compensation to the community based on what
would be paid in salary, bonuses, and fringe benefits would be enough. Since
the court labeled this method "reasonable compensation," it is not clear whether
the court realized it was applying the reimbursement rule of Texas. However,
limiting the community only to reimbursement would be consistent with earlier
decisions adopting the inception of title theory for the state. 73
Ten years later, in 1984, the Missouri Supreme Court followed suit in
Hoffmann 74 when it held that no portion of the increase would be marital property because the nonowner spouse failed to prove that the shareholder spouse's
compensation had been inadequate or that he had sacrificed payment of marital
funds. It is unclear in the opinion whether the record showed that most of the
increase *vas due to economic factors or to spousal efforts. If the former, the
holding is in accord with the California reasonable compensation cases. If the
latter, which the dissenting justice thought possible,' 75 only a reimbursement rule
was applied. If the Missouri court was limiting the marital property when efforts
176
were the major contributor to the increase, this case would be a strange anomaly.

"I See, e.g., Holloway v. Holloway, 671 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), which was tried before
and the appeal decided after Jensen. The husband had two separate stock holdings which increased
from $1,000 to thirty million dollars and from $3,000 to sixty million dollars. The trial court had
found the increase due to efforts and divided it all as community property. The court applied Jensen
holding that the community could be reimbursed only for the value of the husband's services and
remanded for new trial.
7 Speer, 96 Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314.
"I See Fisher, 86 Idaho 131, 383 P.2d 840. See also Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 584 P.2d
604 (1978), holding adequate compensation sufficient for the community.

17 Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817.
175Id.

at 830 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
The writer questions that the opinion actually adopted reasonable compensation as the only
way to apportion any increase in value. The case was tried and argued under the inception of title
theory; there was no discussion of apportionment methods or a rule stated and no cases were cited
for the proposition that reasonable compensation was the only appropriate method. There is even
room for doubt that the record established efforts contributing to the increase at all. The court stated
that the shareholder spouse's efforts had "an impact" on the increased value, Id. at 825, but also
stated that the "unusual growth and prosperity of the company was directly attributable to the unforeseen. . .consequences of federal and state legislative enactments.... ." Id. at 826.
The Missouri court also has stated that the shareholder spouse must be in a position to control
1'7
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Earlier in the opinion, the court adopted the source of funds rule in order to
better recognize the partnership nature of marriage by classing increase in value
acquired during marriage due to marital funds and efforts as marital.1 7 7 To limit
the marital estate to only reimbursement is wholly inconsistent with that larger
purpose.
The reasonable compensation method, when evidence establishes that the
property was the chief contributor to the increase in value, protects both the
marital and separate interests fairly well. However, when efforts are the primary
contributor to the increase in value, the reasonable compensation method is unwarranted because it limits the marital share to less than actual contribution. In
the Speer case, the limitation protected the separate property at the expense of
the community. 7 Although this is appropriate in a community property jurisdiction following the inception of title approach, modern equitable distribution
statutes call for an expansive definition of marital property to further the legislative intent of recognizing the partnership contribution to property. Insulating
a portion of the value created by partners' efforts within separate property prevents sharing that product of the partnership.
4.

Suggested Approach to Apportionment

None of the methods commonly used for apportionment escape criticism. The
shortcomings of the reasonable return and reasonable compensation methods include paradoxical labels which tend to obscure their purpose and requirements.
The risk of converting the reasonable compensation method to the reimbursement
method, thus, inappropriately limiting the amount credited to the marital partnership could undermine the purposes of equitable distribution when a close corporation has increased in value. A disadvantage of both methods is that they
require a baseline decision or approximation as to whether separate property or
marital effort was the primary contributor. King's criticism of this feature remains
applicable even after twenty-five years of ensuing litigation: the risk of small error
in determining the primary contributor has large consequences. Both methods

or influence the remuneration received. Heilman, 700 S.W.2d 843. This requirement is unusual in a
straight apportionment case and probably was misapplied from retained earnings and piercing the
corporate veil cases. See Krauskopf, supra note 135, at 787-88.
I" The court said, "By adopting the source of funds rule theory, our statutes and their purpose
of promoting the partnership theory of marriage will be consistent in providing for the most equitable
distribution of property," and referred to a statement in a leading case that the marital community
should be entitled to share in the proportionate increase in value of property attributable to marital
funds and labor [emphasis added]. Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d at 825 (citing Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 7677).
M."The community portion was limited to reasonable salary even though the trial court had found
community efforts "greatly exceeded" the compensation paid. Speer, 96 Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314,

323 (1974).
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entail extensive production of evidence to show which source contributed more
to the increase and to establish the adequacy of compensation. The range of
possible findings -,n those ambiguous factors causes highly unpredictable results.
To enhance uniformity and, thereby, to increase predictability of results and
encourage settlements, a single method of apportionment should be articulated
as guidance for trial judges. Preferably, application should be relatively clear and
predictable. The method should have an unambiguous descriptive label. Either
allocating only a reasonable salary for the services to the marital estate or allocating only an investment return on the separate property would meet these
simplification requirements. But a more important requirement must be met.
The old dilemma of whether to favor the marital or separate estate must be
answered in order to choose a single apportionment method. The answer is to
choose the method which favors the marital estate, thus promoting the basic
partnership concept of the statute.
Consider the common conditions under which one spouse renders most of
his or her working efforts to investments or a business enterprise owned prior to
marriage or acquired by gift during marriage. Ordinarily, this begins early in the
marriage with the express or tacit agreement of the nonowner spouse. Often, the
couple knows they are foregoing a higher standard of living while efforts are
devoted to the business rather than in a salaried position. Commonly, the nonowner spouse not only helps in the business in the early days, but also continues
to take an active interest in its progress and supports the efforts of the working
spouse, thus enabling more productivity. Both of these married partners are willing
to engage in the risks and stresses of developing that business because they ultimately expect to share greater rewards from its prosperity than they would if
the owner spouse were merely a salaried employee. The owner of an already wellestablished business who marries, particularly a second or third marriage later in
life, may not have these expectations. However, that person knows that a premarital agreement can safely protect the value of efforts devoted to the business
in the event of a marriage dissolution. In the absence of an agreement, it is fair
to assume that even then all efforts of the spouses are committed to the marriage.
The practical context of the apportionment issue is a marriage in which marital
effort has been expended for the benefit of the family. All the components of
marriage as an economic partnership are present: commitment of effort, enablement, and expectation of sharing. Therefore, all capital value created by spousal
efforts should be marital without regard to previous compensation for the efforts.
To hold otherwise is to imply that marriage does not include a commitment of
all effort to family welfare, but rather, that only a salary is owed. 719 Assuming
the goal of equitable distribution is to recognize the full marriage partnership

119Krauskopf, supra note 135, at 789.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss4/11

38

Krauskopf: Classifying Marital and Separate Property--Combinations and Incre
1987]

MARITAL AND SEPARATE PROPERTY

1035

concept, the marital estate should be favored. However, the underlying object of
a marriage partnership in which efforts are committed to the partnership is not
offended by allocating to the separate estate an investment return when economic
conditions have affected the separate property. An acknowledged willingness to
expand the marital property and narrow the separate property at the classification
stage can clarify the selection of a more appropriate apportionment method which
accomodates both these goals.
The following guidelines are offered for an equitable distribution state with
a legislative or judicially created source of funds theory that attributes to marital
property all values created by spousal effort during the marriage. Increase in value
during marriage should be presumed due to marital efforts. The burden of proof
to show that the increase is due to economic conditions should be on the separate
property owner. When this is not possible or when transmutation has occurred,
commonly after a long marriage, all increase should be subject to division.8 0 If
the separate property owner sustains the burden of showing that economic conditions enhanced the separate property and of establishing a reasonable return
for that property, then the increase in value represented by that investment should
be classed as separate property. The excess should be marital property.'8 1 This
should be labeled the marital effort method to distinguish it from other apportionment methods.
5. Nonowner Spouse's Contributions
Since source of funds jurisdictions classify as marital the increase in value
of separate property due to efforts of either spouse, any increase attributable to
work of the nonowner spouse should also be included in marital property. Full
analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 18 2 Although a split of
authority may be developing, 83 it is likely that most courts will hold that those
efforts include not only work in the business,' 84 but also work in maintaining the
home and family. 8

- See cases discussed, supra, notes 136-146 and accompanying text.
M'An analogous system has been set out as jury instructions for apportioning profits of a separate
business owned and operated by a spouse during the marriage. See 7 Am. JuR. PL. & PR. FoRms
Comm. Prop., Form 126 (1982).
"I On this topic, see Goldfarb, Recognizing the Homemaker's Contribution to Appreciation in
Separate Property, F m. L. RiEv., N.Y. St. Bar Assoc. Fam. Law Section (Mar. 1987); Note, The
Need to Value Homemaker Services Upon Divorce, 87 W. VA. L. Rav. 115 (1984); Avner, Valuing
Homemaker Work: An Alternative to Quantification, 4 FAsHARE 11 (Jan. 1984); Bruch, Property
Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemaker Services, 10 FAM. L.
Q. 101 (1976).
83 Compare, e.g., In re Marriage of Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619 (contribution as homemaker not a
substantial contribution of effort that caused an increase in value) with Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503
N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219; Griffith v. Griffith, 185 N.J. Super. 382, 448 A.2d 1035 (1982).
184 The "sweat equity" of Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709.
,' Given credit to a limited extent in LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312.
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The policy of recognizing both the income producing efforts and the indirect
contributions of the homemaker as an equal partner in the marriage when determining what is marital property lies behind the rule of apportionment. The
homemaking function contributes to the marriage directly in the home and indirectly by enabling the income producer to devote all efforts to that task. The
most significant decision on this issue was in Price'8 6 in which the New York
Court of Appeals held that both direct work in the business and indirect efforts
as a homemaker must be considered marital contributions when determining what
portion of the increased value of separate property is subject to division. The
method for valuing indirect contributions at the distribution stage was not ruled
upon. The court held, at the classification stage, that a homemaker's contributions
should be equated with that of the owner spouse's efforts. The New York court
at an earlier time also had suggested that the contributions of the spouses should
be regarded as equal in value. 187 The value of homemaker efforts as enabling
contributions, unlike that of direct contributions, would merge into the increase
due to the owner's efforts. Thus, the amount of appreciation due to efforts during
the marriage would be considered a product of the marital partnership. This is
in accord with the underlying concept that each marital partner contributes equally,
even though in different ways, to the marriage. Similar decisions would be possible
under the West Virginia statutory language specifically including increase due to
the work of either spouse in defining marital property.'
V.

CONCLUSION

By limiting power to divide property at marriage dissolution to property acquired during the marriage, a legislature emphasizes the state's policy that both
spouses, by entering marriage, undertake to contribute their best efforts to benefit
the spouses and any children of the marriage. The commitment of effort, rather
than prior owned or inherited property, characterizes a partnership of equals.
Both commit to the welfare of the family the most precious and the most equally
possessed wealth they have-their time and effort. It follows that classification
of property as marital is the key to a court's power to divide it equitably between
the spouses when the partnership ends. However, the technicalities of classification
give pause to consider its wisdom. Unless courts devise practical rules for classification, ensuing litigation may vitiate the lofty goal of conceptualizing marriage
as a partnership commitment. The more bitter and extended the battles over the
broken pieces, the more we may come to doubt the original devotion. As a society,
we need to strengthen, not weaken, the sense of commitment to the family that
marriage implies. Perhaps we should modify the statutory classification schemes.

Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219.
"7 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 498 N.E.2d 712.
W. VA. CoDE § 48-2-1(e)(2).
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For example, the legislature might decide that marriage implies commitment of
all effort and of all property no matter how acquired unless a contrary intent is
clearly demonstrated. In the meantime, courts should strive for easily administered
rules of classification which -will further the principles of partnership marriage
and enhance predictability of decisions.
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